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Re: State v. Burgess-Beynon, Case No. 20030454-CA
Dear Paulette,
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. At
oral argument on August 16, 2004, defendant raised for the first time a claim that the
"damaging a jail" statute was unconstitutionally vague and therefore violated defendant's
right to notice. The State attaches the following cases relevant to defendant's claim: State
v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, ^ 33 n.5, 64 P.3d 1218 (refusing to reach claim raised for first
time in reply brief); and State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, % 12, 84 P.3d 1171 (holding that
court will uphold facial vagueness challenge '"only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague
in all of its applications," and "statute that is clear as applied to a particular complainant
cannot be considered impermissibly vague in all of its applications") (citation omitted).
Respectfully submitted,

Karen A. Klucznik
Assistant Attorney General
encl.
cc:

D. Bruce Oliver, Attorney for Appellant (w/ encl.)
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
•'• . ! .n :J • k' MOBBS, Defendant and Appellant
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whether proffered evidence
- relevant, and
appellate court will find error in a relevancy ruling
only if the trial court has abused its discretion.
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Following jury trial, defendant was convicted in the
Seventh District Court, Moab Department, Lyle R.
Anderson, J., of aggravated robbery and aggravated
assault. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that: (1) claim of right defense
is not available for the crime of robbery; (2)
probative value of evidence did not outweigh
considerations of time, confusion, delay, and
relevance; (3) jury instruction adequately defined
aggravated robbery; and (4) defendant's claim that
robbery instruction erroneously excluded statutory
language was not preserved for appeal

riminal Law € ^ 1 1 3 4 ( 3 )
« p n ^ Most n t e d Cases
ner trial , >MI
on of b'iness.

- p p\ ,n^::-ick:d tlie jury is a
.laLc court reviews for

[5] Robbery €=>14
342k 14 Most Cited Cases
There is no common law claim, of rights defense to
the charge of robbery.
[6] Statutes €=>188
361kl88 Most Cited Cases
In construing a statute, court must look first to the
plain lanuiirn'r of the statute.

Affirmed.
West Headnotes

[7] Statutes « ^ 1 8 6
361k W M - - '>>d'"-^es

[1] Criminal L a w €=>! 134(3)
11 Okl 134(3) Most Cited Cases

[7] Statutes €=>195
361k i ^ Most Cited Cases

Appellate court reviews trial court's determination
concerning jury instructions for correctness and
accords it no particular deference.

In construing statute, each expit^Mun *u a iv-rm
should be interpreted as the exclusion of anuiher,
and, therefore, omissions in statutory language
should be taken no*'* ^r^nH <nven effect.

:

:•,>,;,aal Law €=>H34(3)
4( 3) Most Cited Cases

Appellate court reviews for correctness a trial
court's statutory interpretation, accjrdmg it no
particular deference.
[3] Criminal L a w €=^338(1)
110k338(l) Most Cited Cases
C p r . i. *

[8] R
342k

t

€^>14
< Cited Cases

Claim i'
-e is not available for the w.....*.
of robl^,
In, . ,e the legislature specifically
provided for the common law defense of claim -t"
right only for theft charges; notwithstanding the ^ 1
that theft is lesser included offense of robbery, the

64P.3d 1218
64 P.3d 1218,466 Utah Adv. Rep. 13,2003 U T App 27
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exclusion of claim of right defense within robbery
statute is evidence of legislature's intent that it not
be available for robbery. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-301,
76-6-302,76-6-402(3).
[9] Robbery €=>14
342kl4 Most Cited Cases
[9] Witnesses €=>374(1)
410k374(l) Most Cited Cases
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[13] Criminal Law €==>822(1)
110k822(l) Most Cited Cases
Jury instructions will be affirmed when the
instructions, taken as a whole, fairly tender the case
to the jury even where one or more of the
instructions, standing alone, are not as full or
accurate as they might have been.
[14] Criminal Law €==>1038.1(4)
110kl038.1(4) Most Cited Cases

Probative value of evidence offered by defendant in
prosecution for aggravated robbery and aggravated
assault of his employer, that employer owed
defendant money and that employer had reputation
for not timely paying his employees, to show
employer's bias and lack of credibility, did not
outweigh considerations of time, confusion, delay,
and relevance, and thus was not admissible, as
evidence was relevant only to defendant's claim of
right defense, which was not defense allowed by
robbery statute, and employer's bias was intended to
be used to support defendant's claim of right
defense. Rules of Evid., Rules 402, 403, 608(b).
[10] Witnesses €=^372(1)
410k372(l) Most Cited Cases
A cross-examiner needs to be given wide latitude in
exposing a witness' potential bias; however, this
wide latitude in cross-examining for witness bias is
limited by rule of evidence permitting exclusion of
otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Rules of Evid., Rules 403, 608(b).
[11] Robbery €^27(2)
342k27(2) Most Cited Cases

Defendant's
claim that robbery
instruction
erroneously omitted statutory language defining
robbery was not preserved for appeal, as defendant
did not object to error at trial and did not argue that
exceptional circumstances existed or that plain error
occurred. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-301(l)(b).
[15] Criminal Law €=>1030(1)
110k 1030(1) Most Cited Cases
As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial
court may not be raised on appeal; this is because
trial court ought to be given an opportunity to
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct
it.
[16] Criminal Law €=^1030(1)
1 lOkl030(1) Most Cited Cases
Preservation rule, that claims not raised before the
trial court generally may not be raised on appeal,
applies to every claim unless a defendant can
demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist or
that plain error occurred.
[17] Criminal Law €^1130(6)
1 lOkl 130(6) Most Cited Cases

In prosecution for aggravated robbery and
aggravated assault, jury instruction adequately
defined aggravated robbery, given that, even though
instruction did not include a definition of robbery
within it, robbery was defined in the next instruction.
[12] Criminal Law €^822(1)
110k822(l) Most Cited Cases
Jury instructions must be evaluated as a whole to
determine their adequacy.

Court of Appeals would not address defendant's
argument that leaving elements of a crime out of a
jury instruction may be plain error, as issue was not
timely raised; issue was raised for first time in
defendant's reply brief.
*1219 Happy Morgan, Grand County Public
Defender, Moab, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General and Karen A.
Klucznik, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
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64 P.3d 1218
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(Cite as: 64 P.3d 1218)
Before Judges
GREENWOOD.

BILLINGS,

BENCH,

and

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
f 1 Richard Lyle Hobbs (Defendant) was
convicted of aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, and aggravated assault, a third degree
felony. Defendant appeals the trial court's rejection
of his proposed jury instructions, defining his claim
of right defense, rejection of evidence relating to his
defense, and the trial court's aggravated robbery
jury instruction.

BACKGROUND
If 2 "In setting out the facts from the record on
appeal, we resolve all conflicts and doubts in favor
of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial
court." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah
1989). On June 24, 2001, Mike Hughes (Hughes),
owner of Adrift Adventures (Adrift), was working
alone at the company headquarters in Moab, Utah.
Defendant, an employee of Adrift, called Hughes to
tell him that he would be coming over to discuss his
paycheck. [FN1]
FN1. The parties dispute whether
Defendant also intended to pick up a gun
that Hughes purportedly held for
Defendant.
\ 3 When Defendant arrived, Hughes and
Defendant
proceeded upstairs to discuss
Defendant's payroll problems. While waiting for
the account to come up on the computer, Hughes
and Defendant started arguing about whether money
was owed to Defendant and about an impending
civil suit Defendant threatened to file against
Hughes. Hughes testified that as he was turning
toward Defendant to tell him he would look into the
account, Defendant, pointing a gun at Hughes, told
him, "you owe me money," and "things are over for
you." Hughes testified that he believed he was
going to die.

*1220 If 4 Hughes then told Defendant that if they
went downstairs he could have all the money in the
till, approximately $2,000. Defendant followed
Hughes downstairs. As they neared the bottom of
the stairs Hughes threw papers up in the air and
fled, running down the street yelling, "He's got a
gun." One witness, Officer Green, testified that he
saw Defendant chasing Hughes with a gun in his
hand and turned his vehicle around to assess the
situation. Another witness, Alex Crosby (Crosby),
also testified that he saw Defendant with a gun in
his hand, chasing Hughes.
Tf 5 As Hughes was running down the street, he
flagged down a patrol car, driven by Officer Reger.
Officer Reger exited the vehicle. Hughes jumped
into the patrol car and drove about half a block
before stopping and exiting the vehicle. Officer
Reger testified that when Hughes jumped into his
patrol car, Defendant turned and walked away,
holding something in his hand.
^ 6 Hughes testified that Defendant was still
running toward him with a gun when he exited the
patrol car. Crosby testified that he saw Defendant
chase Hughes after he exited the patrol car. After
exiting the patrol car Hughes saw two of his
employees, screamed, "[Defendant] is trying to kill
me," and dove into their vehicle. The two
employees testified that they saw Defendant holding
a gun above his head at the time Hughes jumped
into their vehicle. The gun was never fired nor was
any money taken from Adrift.
f 7 At this point, Officer Green approached the
scene and saw Officer Reger, who was dressed in
plain clothes, holding a gun. Officer Green
approached Officer Reger with his gun drawn.
After a short stand off, Officer Reger identified
himself, and the two officers proceeded to look for
Defendant. Defendant claimed that after he saw the
officers in a stand off, with guns drawn, he left the
scene for his own safety.
f 8 A witness saw Defendant toss something into
some bushes where officers found a magazine clip
with a bullet in it, as well as an unspent shell.
Several hours later, Defendant turned himself into
the police. Although not giving his correct name,
Defendant stated: "Here I am, I did it."

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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If 9 Prior to trial, Defendant filed proposed jury
instructions that included instructions on a claim of
right defense based on his "bona fide impression
and honest belief that the money he was seeking
was his own." At trial, the court rejected
Defendant's proposed instructions and prohibited
evidence related to his claim of right defense.
Defendant was found guilty of aggravated robbery
and aggravated assault. Defendant appeals his
conviction of aggravated robbery.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2] If 10 Defendant first argues the trial court
erred in rejecting his proposed jury instructions
relating to his claim of right defense. "[W]e review
the trial court's determination concerning jury
instructions for correctness and accord it no
particular deference." State v. Jones, 878 P.2d
1175, 1176 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Additionally,
"[w]e review for correctness a trial court's statutory
interpretation, according it no particular deference."
State v. Barrick 2002 UT App I20,1f 4, 46 P.3d
770 (quotations and citations omitted).
[3] 1f 11 Defendant next argues the trial court
erred in not permitting evidence of Defendant's
claim of right defense by excluding evidence that
the victim, Hughes, had a reputation for dishonesty,
and had a practice of underpaying employees. "[A]
trial court has broad discretion to determine
whether proffered evidence is relevant, and we will
find error in a relevancy ruling only if the trial court
has abused its discretion." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT
35,H 17, 999 P.2d 7 (quotations and citation
omitted).
[4] % 12 Finally, Defendant argues the trial court
inadequately instructed the jury on aggravated
robbery and robbery. Whether the trial court
properly instructed the jury is a question of law,
which this court reviews for correctness. See State
v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13,111, 17 P.3d 1153.
*1221 ANALYSIS
I. Proposed Jury Instructions Relating to Claim of
Right Defense
\ 13 Defendant was convicted of aggravated
robbery under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1)
(1999), which states: "A person commits
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aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon...." (Emphasis added.) Robbery
is committed when:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes
or attempts to take personal property in the
possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means of
force or fear; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses
force or fear of immediate force against another
in the course of committing a theft.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (1999).
Defendant argues that he is entitled to assert a claim
of right defense by virtue of (1) the case of People
v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492, 494 (1895)
(permitting claim of right defense where defendant
had an honest belief in his entitlement to property);
and (2) the robbery statute, which incorporates the
defenses in the theft statute.
A. Viability of People v. Hughes
| 14 In Hughes, the defendant was found guilty of
robbery when he used a gun to take money from
fellow gamblers. See Hughes, 39 P. at 492. The
defendant's theory was that he took the money
under a "claim of ownership, and an honest belief
that [he] had a right to the money." Id. The trial
court, however, rejected a jury instruction defining
the claim of right defense and instead instructed the
jury that it was immaterial whose money was taken
by the defendant. See id. at 494. On appeal, the
supreme court reversed, stating:
[It] was material, and the burden of proof was on
the prosecution to prove the money was owned by
some person other than the defendant, for, if the
money belonged to him, and it was wrongfully in
the possession of another, he would not be guilty
of robbery, as the animus furandi [felonious
intent] would be wanting.
Id.
[5] \ 15 Defendant argues that Hughes has never
been overruled and is binding precedent. Thus, the
trial court erred in not permitting instructions
relating to the claim of right defense. The trial
court held that the claim of right defense described
in Hughes was superseded by 1973 changes to the
Utah Code. We agree. First, Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-105 (1999), enacted in 1973, abolished

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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common law crimes such as robbery. Second, the
claim of right defense was superseded by Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (1999), also enacted in 1973,
which states, "[t]he provisions of this code shall
govern the construction of, the punishment for, and
defenses against any offense defined in this code...."
(Emphasis added.) Because section 76-1-103
states that the criminal code governs all defenses,
the claim of right defense for robbery is not
available if it is not specifically designated as a
defense in the criminal code.
f 16 Our reasoning is supported by State v.
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991). In Gardiner,
the defendant argued that he had a right to resist
arrest under the common law. See id at 569.
After detailed analysis of the common law, the court
determined that it was "not free to fashion" a rule
respecting the common law theories of resisting
arrest because the legislature had already acted. Id.
at 573. The court reasoned that where the
legislature enacted a number of specific and general
defenses, the failure to enact a general illegal arrest
defense "preclude[d] [the court] from finding any
generally available common law right.... If such a
defense exists in Utah, it must be grounded in the
specific code sections under which [the defendant]
was convicted." Id. at 574.
% 17 The case of State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638
(Utah 1983), provides additional support. In
Durant, the defendant was charged with aggravated
arson for burning a "habitable structure." Id. at 639.
The defendant argued that at common law it was
legal to burn one's own dwelling; therefore, where
he received permission from the owner-himself-to
burn the dwelling, he could not be guilty *1222 of
aggravated arson. See id. Specifically, the
defendant argued that the term "unlawfully" in the
arson statute maintained the common law arson
definition, which included malicious burning but
excluded the burning of one's own dwelling by
requiring the burned property to be that "of
another." Id. at 640.
If 18 The court determined that the legislature's
omission of "property of another" and inclusion of
"habitable structure" in the revision of the arson
statute was purposeful and evidence of a shifting
emphasis on protecting human life. Id. at 641. The
court held that the legislature's use of the terms

"unlawfully" and "intentionally," changed the mens
rea of arson to "require that the burning be other
than accidental or careless and that the damage be
without justification and contrary to safety
precautions." [FN2] Id. at 645. The court stated,
" 'It is the power and responsibility of the
Legislature to enact laws to promote the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare of
society, and this Court will not substitute our
judgment for that of the Legislature with regard to
what best serves the public interest.' " Id. at 642
(quoting Bastion v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah
1983)).

FN2. Similar to State v. Durant, 674 P.2d
638 (Utah 1983), our legislature has
changed the mens rea to "unlawfully and
intentionally" when defining robbery as the
attempt to take or taking of property by
means of force or fear. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (1999). There is no
qualification in this definition that permits
the taking of property, even if owned by
the taker, if doing so involves force. This
definition is unambiguous, thus reflecting
the legislature's intent to do what "best
serves the public interest" by making it
illegal to use force to recover any property.
Durant, 674 P.2d at 642.

\ 19 Consequently, we conclude that Hughes has
been superseded by the 1973 amendments to the
criminal code which does not require consideration
of the common law claim of right defense.
B. Robbery Statute
\ 20 Defendant next argues that even if Hughes
was superseded by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105, the
claim of right defense still exists because theft,
requiring the taking of another's property, is a lesser
included offense of robbery. Therefore, according
to Defendant, the statutory defenses to theft are
necessarily included as defenses to robbery. We
disagree.
[6] [7] t 21 The court must "look first to the plain
language of the statute." Stephens v. Bonneville
Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997). Each

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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expression of a term "should be interpreted as the
exclusion of another. Therefore, omissions in
statutory language should 'be taken note of and
given effect.' " Biddle v. Washington Terrace City,
1999 UT 110,1[ 14, 993 P.2d 875 (quoting
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d
102, 105, 514 P.2d 217, 219 (1973)); see also In re
A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098 (Utah Ct.App.1997)
(giving force to legislature's choice to exclude
rehabilitation from consideration under serious
youth offender act where legislature's inclusion in
other sections of code indicates legislature knew
how to include such factor).
[8] If 22 The claim of right defense is clearly
available for the crime of theft:
It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the
property or service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right
to obtain or exercise control over the property or
service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the
property or service honestly believing that the
owner, if present, would have consented.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(3) (1999). However,
the claim of right defense is not specified as an
available defense for robbery or aggravated
robbery. See id. §§ 76-6-301 to -302. Where the
legislature was obviously aware of the availability
of the claim of right defense, having included it
within the definition of theft, we assume the
legislature would have included it within the
robbery statute had the legislature intended to do so.
f 23 Many other jurisdictions have addressed this
issue and determined that although the claim of
right defense may be statutorily available for theft
offenses, it is *1223 not available for robbery or
burglary offenses. For example, the Iowa Court of
Appeals, considering an appeal of a burglary
conviction, analyzed their robbery and burglary
statutes to determine whether the claim of right
defense was available for those crimes. See State
v. Miller, 622 N.W.2d 782, 785 (Iowa Ct.App.2000)
. The court determined that although Iowa's claim
of right defense statute expressly states its
availability for a person "guilty of theft," defendants
accused of robbery and burglary were not permitted
to use the defense. Id. The Miller court stated that
to permit another interpretation "would require us to
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read something into the law that is not apparent
from the words chosen by the legislature." Id The
court went on to analyze the "modern trend ... to
decline to recognize the claim-of-right defense to
offenses involving force, such as robbery or
burglary." Id; see also People v. Tufunga, 21
Cal.4th 935, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 987 P.2d 168,
177-78 (1999) (outlining modern trend). The
reasons for this conclusion are well-stated in State
v. Ortiz, 124 N.J.Super. 189, 305 A.2d 800 (1973),
where the court found the proposition that a claim
of right negates the felonious intent of robbery lacks
logic and "is utterly incompatible with and has no
place in an ordered and orderly society such as ours,
which eschews self-help through violence.
Adoption of the proposition would be but one step
short of accepting lawless reprisal as an appropriate
means of redressing grievances, real or fancied."
[FN3] Id at 802 (footnote omitted).

FN3. Other cases holding that a claim of
right defense is not available in robbery
cases include the following: Whitescarver
v. State, 962 P.2d 192, 195 (Alaska
Ct.App.1998); State v. Schaefer, 163 Ariz.
626, 790 P.2d 281, 284 (Ariz.Ct.App.1990)
; Thomas v. State, 584 So.2d 1022, 1026
(Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1991); Westmoreland v.
State, 245 Ga.App. 482, 538 S.E.2d 119,
121 (2000); Crowder v. State, 241
Ga.App. 818, 527 S.E.2d 901, 904 (2000);
Hamby v. State, 206 Ga.App. 791, 426
S.E.2d" 670, 671-72 (1992); State v.
Brighter, 62 Haw. 25, 608 P.2d 855, 859
(1980); Cates v. State, 21 Md.App. 363,
320 A.2d 75, 82 (1974); People v. Reid,
69 N.Y.2d 469, 515 N.Y.S.2d 750, 508
N.E.2d 661, 665 (1987); People v.
Hodges, 113 A.D.2d 514, 496 N.Y.S.2d
771, 774 (N.Y.App.Div.1985); In re
Hammer, 139 Misc.2d 782, 528 N.Y.S.2d
784,
785
(N.Y.Fam.Ct.1988);
Commonwealth v. Sleighter, 495 Pa. 262,
433
A.2d
469,
471
(1981);
Commonwealth v. Dombrauskas, 274
Pa.Super. 452, 418 A.2d 493, 497 (1980);
State v. Self, 42 Wash.App. 654, 713 P.2d
142, 144 (1986); cf. Ala.Code §
13A-8-44 (1994); State v. Messier, 16
Conn.App. 455, 549 A.2d 270, 274 (1988).
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1f 24 We therefore hold that the claim of right
defense is not available for the crime of robbery
because the legislature specifically provided for the
common law defense of claim of right only for theft
charges. The exclusion of the defense for robbery
charges is evidence of the legislature's intent that it
not be available for robbery. Consequently, the
trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on
the claim of right defense.

have concluded above that the defense is not
available to Defendant. Therefore, it was not error
for the trial judge to exclude evidence relating to a
defense that is no longer available. See id; see
also Utah R. Evid. 402 ("Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible."); State v. Jaeger, 1999
UT l,1f 13, 973 P.2d 404 ("[W]here the proffered
evidence has no probative value to a fact at issue, it
is irrelevant and is inadmissible under rule 402.").

II. Evidence of the Victim's Bias & Dishonesty
Tf 25 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
not permitting greater inquiry into Hughes's
reputation for dishonesty. [FN4] Defendant argues
that evidence of Hughes's dishonesty and business
practices would have been used by Defendant to
show Hughes's bias and lack of credibility.

[9] [10] Tf 27 Defendant also argues that rule
608(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides him
with unfettered discretion to present evidence of a
victim's bias. Rule 608(c) states, "Bias, prejudice
or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to
impeach the witness either by examination of the
witness or by evidence otherwise adduced." It has
long been recognized that a cross-examiner needs to
be given "wide latitude in exposing a witness'
potential bias." State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200,
203 (Utah 1987); State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386,
1388 (Utah 1977). However, this "wide latitude"
in cross-examining for witness bias is "limited by
Utah Rule of Evidence 403." Hackford, 137 P.2d at
203. Rule 403 permits the exclusion of otherwise
relevant evidence "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." Utah R, Evid. 403; see also Hackford,
737P.2dat203.

FN4. Defendant was permitted to present
evidence of Hughes's character trait for
dishonesty through two witnesses who
both stated that Hughes had a reputation
for dishonesty in the community.

*[[ 26 "[A] trial court has broad discretion to
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant,
and [this court] will find error in a relevancy ruling
only if the trial court has abused its discretion."
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,^ 17, 999 P.2d 7
(quotation and citations omitted). Defendant
argues that the ability to produce evidence
supporting his defense is a constitutional right
guaranteed by the Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("In
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend...."). Accord Utah Code
Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(a) (1999). However, although
Defendant cites State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33
(Utah 1981) to support his claim, he fails to
acknowledge the court's statement that if "there is
no reasonable basis in the evidence to support the
defense or its essential components, it is not error
for the trial judge to either refuse to instruct the jury
as to the defense, or to instruct them to disregard
it" Id. at 34. Defendant sought to *1224
introduce evidence to prove that Hughes owed him
money and had a reputation for not timely paying
his employees. The evidence was relevant only to
his claim of right defense. Defendant's claim of
right defense was rejected by the trial court, and we

K 28 The trial court stated that although the
grievances of other employees
may all tend to show a special sensitivity on Mr.
Hughes' part ... it does so at the cost of a
considerable amount of time, introducing the
potential for confusion of the issues, delay, and I
just don't think it's worth-and some possible
prejudice, I guess, to Mr. Hughes that he ends up
being put on trial when he's the alleged victim in
this case and he isn't in control of the prosecution.
Where considerations of time, confusion, and
delay were enumerated by the trial court, Defendant
has not shown that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that the probative value of
Hughes's bias, which was to be used to support
Defendant's rejected claim of right defense, was
substantially
outweighed
by
considerations
permitted by rule 403.
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III. Adequacy of Jury Instructions
1f 29 The Defendant claims that the aggravated
robbery instruction and robbery instruction were
incorrect, requiring reversal of his robbery
conviction.
% 30 The relevant instructions state:
Instruction No. 3
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must
prove each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Those elements are as
follows:
COUNT I: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
1. That on or about June 29, 2001, defendant,
while in the course of committing robbery,
2. Did use a dangerous weapon,
3. Knowingly and intentionally.
Instruction No. 4
Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or
attempted taking of personal property from
another, from his person or in his immediate
presence, by means offeree or fear.
Personal property means anything of value other
than land. I can not [sic] assert a defense to a
charge of robbery that I believe that the other
person owes me money.
[11][12][13] f 31 Defendant first finds error with
Instruction 3, arguing that the trial court did not
clearly define aggravated robbery because the
instruction did not include a definition of robbery
within it. However, "[j]ury instructions must be
evaluated as a whole to determine their adequacy."
State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19,Tf 13, 18 P.3d
1123. *1225 Jury instructions will be affirmed
"when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly
tender the case to the jury [even where] one or more
of the instructions, standing alone, are not as full or
accurate as they might have been." Id. (quotations
and citations omitted) (alteration in original). Here,
the trial court defined robbery in the next
instruction. Read as a whole the instructions
adequately defined robbery.
[14] If 32 Defendant also finds error with
Instruction 4, because the trial court omitted
subsection 76-6-301(1 )(b), which states that
robbery can also be committed if "the person
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intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of
immediate force against another in the course of
committing a theft." Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-301(1 )(b). Defendant argues that the trial court
erred in not including this second definition of
robbery within the instruction.
[15][16][17] % 33 Defendant's argument fails
because it was not preserved for appeal. Defendant
did not object to Instruction 4. "As a general rule,
claims not raised before the trial court may not be
raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,Tf
11, 10 P.3d 346. This is because the " 'trial court
ought to be given an opportunity to address a
claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.1 " Id.
(quoting State v Eldredge, 713 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah
1989)). The "preservation rule applies to every
claim ... unless a defendant can demonstrate that
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error'
occurred." Id. (citations omitted). Defendant has
not argued plain error [FN5] or exceptional
circumstances on appeal. We therefore do not
address the argument further.
FN5. Defendant raises for the first time in
his reply brief the argument that leaving
elements of a crime out of a jury
instruction may be plain error. Because
this issue was not timely raised, we do not
address it. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT
89,1[ 23, 16 P.3d 540 ("Generally, issues
raised by an appellant in the reply brief
that were not presented in the opening
brief are considered waived and will not be
considered by the appellate court.").

CONCLUSION
If 34 In conclusion, we hold that the claim of right
defense is not available for the crime of robbery
because (1) the defense has been superseded by
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-103 and -105, and (2) the
exclusion of the defense in the definition of robbery
and the inclusion of the defense for the crime of
theft is evidence of the legislature's intent that the
claim of right defense is not available for robbery.
1f 35 Additionally, we hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in rejecting additional
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evidence of Hughes's bias because the claim of right
defense is unavailable for robbery and because the
court prohibited the evidence properly under rule
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
| 36 Finally, we hold that the trial court properly
instructed the jury as to the definitions of robbery
and aggravated robbery, because, read as a whole,
the instructions were complete. Also, Defendant
did not properly preserve the issue of whether the
trial court erred in not including section 76-6301(l)(b) in Instruction 4. Thus, we affirm.
If 37 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS,
Associate Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W.
BENCH, Judge.
64 P.3d 1218, 466 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 2003 UT
App 27
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Roger Martin MacGUIRE, Defendant and
Petitioner.

[1] Criminal Law €=^1134(3)
110k! 134(3) Most Cited Cases
Whether the trial court properly interpreted a statute
is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness.
[2] Criminal Law €==>1134(3)
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases

No. 20020071.
Jan. 23, 2004.
Background: Defendant was charged with two
counts of aggravated murder for allegedly killing
his former wife and her unborn child. Defendant
filed motion to dismiss Count I in part and Count II
in its entirety, arguing that he could not be
prosecuted for killing the unborn child or be
charged with aggravated murder based on that
killing, because the criminal homicide and
aggravated murder statutes are unconstitutional.
The District Court, Davis County, Michael G.
Allphin, J., denied motion. Defendant petitioned for
review of this interlocutory order.
Holding: Upon grant of petition, the Supreme
Court, Durrant, Associate Chief Justice, held that:
term "unborn child" did not render criminal
homicide and aggravated murder statutes
unconstitutionally vague in violation of due
process, either facially, or as applied.
Affirmed.
Parrish, J., filed concurring opinion, in which
Durrant, Associate Chief Justice, Wilkins, and
Nehring, JJ., joined.
Durham, C.J., filed dissenting opinion.
West Headnotes

Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness, with the
reviewing court giving no deference to the trial
court.
[3] Constitutional Law €==>48(1)
92k48(l) Most Cited Cases
Legislative enactments
constitutional.

are

presumed

to be

[4] Constitutional Law €=>48(1)
92k48(l) Most Cited Cases
Those who challenge a statute as unconstitutional
bear a heavy burden of demonstrating its
unconstitutionality.
[5] Constitutional Law €=>258(3.1)
92k258(3.1) Most Cited Cases
[5] Homicide €=^523
203k523 Most Cited Cases
Term "unborn child" did not render criminal
homicide and aggravated murder statutes
unconstitutionally vague in violation of due
process, either facially, or as applied; term clearly
encompassed a human being at any stage of
development in utero, and thus statutes provided
adequate notice to ordinary person about what
conduct was proscribed, and, because meaning of
term was readily ascertainable, its inclusion did not
encourage or facilitate arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend.
14;
U.C.A.1953,
765-202(l)(b); U.C.A.1953,
76-5-201(1) (1999).
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[6] Constitutional Law €=>48(4.1)
92k48(4.1) Most Cited Cases
Where a statute implicates no constitutionally
protected conduct, a court will uphold a facial
vagueness challenge only if the statute is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications.
[7] Criminal Law €=>13.1(1)
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases
A statute that is clear as applied to a particular
complainant cannot be considered impermissibly
vague in all of its applications and thus will
necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge.
[8] Criminal Law €^13.1(1)
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases
To establish that the complained-of statutory
provisions are impermissibly vague, a defendant
must demonstrate either (1) that the statutes do not
provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary
people to understand what conduct is prohibited, or
(2) that the statutes encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.
[9] Constitutional Law €==>251.4
92k251.4 Most Cited Cases
Vagueness questions are essentially procedural due
process issues, i.e., whether the statute adequately
notices
the
proscribed
conduct.
U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 14.
[10] Criminal Law €=>13.1(1)
110kl3.1(1) Most Cited Cases
If a statute is sufficiently explicit to inform the
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited, it is not
unconstitutionally vague.
[11] Statutes €==>188
361kl88 Most Cited Cases
In considering the meaning of a statutory provision,
the analysis begins with the plain language of the
provision.
[12] Statutes € ^ 1 8 8
361kl88 Most Cited Cases
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In interpreting a statute, the court need not look
beyond the plain language unless it finds some
ambiguity in it.
[13] Statutes €=»205
361k205 Most Cited Cases
[13] Statutes €=>208
361k208 Most Cited Cases
[13] Statutes €=>223.2(.5)
361k223.2(.5) Most Cited Cases
The plain language of a statute is to be read as a
whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony
with other provisions in the same statute and with
other statutes under the same and related chapters.
[14] Criminal Law €^13.1(1)
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases
In addition to providing adequate notice about what
conduct is proscribed, the "void for vagueness"
doctrine requires the legislature to define the
criminal offense in a manner that does not
encourage
Eirbitrary
and
discriminatory
enforcement; in other words, the legislature must
establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.
[15] Criminal Law €=>13.1(1)
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases
The "void for vagueness" doctrine does not require
a legislature to define statutory terms that are
readily ascertainable.
[16] Criminal Law €=>1072
110kl072 Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court declined to address on appeal issue
of whether criminal homicide and aggravated
murder statutes violated equal protection; defendant
failed to petition for interlocutory review of issue,
Supreme Court, thus, did not grant defendant
permission to appeal this issue, and, because
petition made no reference to equal protection
argument or provided concise analysis of legal
authority, the state was denied opportunity to
respond to issue. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14;
Const. Art. 1, § 24; Rules App.Proc, Rule 5(a),
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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*1172 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., J. Frederic
Voros, Jr., Christopher D. Ballard, Asst. Att'ys
Gen., William K. McGuire, Davis County Att'y,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
^f 1 Utah's criminal homicide statute provides that
a person may be prosecuted for causing the death of
an unborn child. This interlocutory appeal concerns
(1) whether the term "unborn child" is
unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as
applied, and (2) whether the criminal homicide and
aggravated murder statutes violate the federal and
state guarantees of equal protection.
f 2 Defendant Roger Martin MacGuire has been
charged with two counts of aggravated murder for
allegedly killing his former wife and her unborn
child. In a motion to dismiss Count I in part and
Count II in its entirety, defendant contended he
could not be prosecuted for killing the unborn child
or be charged with aggravated murder based on that
killing because Utah's criminal homicide and
aggravated murder statutes are unconstitutional.
The district court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss and defendant petitioned *1173 for review
of the interlocutory order. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
f 3 Defendant has been charged with the murder
of his former wife, Susan C. MacGuire, and her
unborn child. According to accounts presented at
the preliminary hearing, [FN1] defendant learned,
several days prior to the murder, that Ms. MacGuire
was engaged and expecting a baby. He called his
former father-in-law on January 14, 2001, to
confirm the information. On the morning of
January 15, 2001, defendant allegedly entered the
insurance office where Ms. MacGuire worked and
shot her four times.

FN1. The facts included in this section
have not been established at trial but
remain mere allegations.

% 4 One of the bullets entered Ms. MacGuire at
the base of her neck and traveled through the
occipital bone of the skull. A second bullet entered
and exited her left forearm. A third bullet entered
the side of her abdomen approximately at the
waistline and pierced her abdominal wall and small
intestine. A fourth bullet entered her abdomen and
traveled through her uterus, lodging in the right wall
of her pelvis. [FN2]

FN2. Although the medical examiner did
not specify the exact order of the gunshot
wounds, she did testify that the gunshot
wounds to the abdomen likely occurred
prior to the gunshot wound to the head.
She had no opinion as to when the gunshot
wound to the arm occurred.

If 5 This fourth bullet lethally injured the unborn
child Ms. MacGuire was carrying. It severed the
umbilical cord and traveled through the placenta
and unborn child itself before lodging in the pelvic
wall. The medical examiner estimated that the
gestational age of the unborn child was between
thirteen and fifteen weeks at the time of death. Ms.
MacGuire was life-flighted to a hospital where she
died later that day.
f 6 Defendant has been charged with two counts
of aggravated murder. Count I of the information
charges defendant with aggravated murder for the
death of Ms. MacGuire and alleges two aggravating
circumstances; namely, (1) two persons were killed
during the same criminal episode, and (2) the
homicide was committed to retaliate against or
prevent Ms. MacGuire from testifying, providing
evidence, or participating in a legal proceeding or
official investigation. [FN3] Count II of the
information charges defendant with aggravated
murder for the death of the unborn child during a
criminal episode in which two persons were killed.

FN3. The second aggravating factor is
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based upon the allegation that when
defendant arrived at Ms. MacGuire's
workplace just prior to the murder, Ms.
MacGuire threatened to call the police and
report defendant for violating a protective
order that was in place at the time.

Tf 7 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the first
aggravating factor in Count I and to dismiss Count
II in its entirety on the basis that an unborn child is
not a person under the aggravated murder statute,
and the criminal homicide and aggravated murder
statutes are unconstitutionally vague and violate
equal protection guarantees. The district court
denied defendant's motion, and defendant filed a
petition for interlocutory appeal. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section
78-2-2(3 )(h) (2002).
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2][3][4] 1f 8 Whether the district court
properly interpreted Utah's criminal homicide and
aggravated murder statutes "is a question of law that
we review for correctness." State v. Gomez, 2002
UT 120, \ 11, 63 P.3d 72. Likewise, "[w]hether a
statute is constitutional is a question of law [that]
we review for correctness, giving no deference to
the trial court." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, If 30,
40 P.3d 611 (citing State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991,
995
(Utah
1995)).
Moreover,
"legislative
enactments are presumed to be constitutional."
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d
816, 819 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). As a
result, "those who challenge a statute ... as
unconstitutional bear" a heavy "burden of
demonstrating its unconstitutionality." Id. (citations
omitted); accord Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1009 (Russon,
J., concurring and dissenting) (stating the burden of
"challenging the constitutionality of a *1174
statute" is "a heavy one"); United States v. Nat'l
Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32, 83 S.Ct. 594,
9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963) (noting that a "strong
presumptive validity" attaches to legislative acts).
II. VAGUENESS CHALLENGE
[5] f 9 Defendant challenges the criminal
homicide and aggravated murder statutes of the
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Utah Code as being unconstitutionally vague both
facially and as applied. The criminal homicide
statute provides as follows:
(a) A person commits criminal homicide if he
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal
negligence, or acting with a mental state
otherwise specified in the statute defining the
offense, causes the death of another human
being, including an unborn child
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal
homicide for the death of an unborn child caused
by an abortion.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201(1) (1999) (emphasis
added).
\ 10 The aggravated murder statute provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated
murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of another under any of the
following circumstances:
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one
act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal
episode during which two or more persons were
killed....
Id. § 76-5-202(l)(b) (emphasis added).
f 11 Defendant contends the term "unborn child"
in the criminal homicide statute is unconstitutionally
vague because the legislature failed to define the
term and, absent that definition, it lacks a clear and
specific meaning. Moreover, because "unborn
child" is not defined, defendant contends the terms
"another" and "persons" in the aggravated murder
statute are also unconstitutionally vague because it
is impossible to know when an unborn child
achieves the status of a person. We disagree.
A. Voidfor Vagueness Doctrine
[6][7] f 12 Where, as here, a statute "implicates
no constitutionally protected conduct," a court will
uphold a facial vagueness challenge "only if the
[statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications." Village of Hoffman Estates v. The
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 49495, 102 S.Ct 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). A
statute that is clear as applied to a particular
complainant cannot be considered impermissibly
vague in all of its applications and thus will
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necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge.
See id. at 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186 ("A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others.").
[8] \ 13 In order to establish that the
complained-of provisions are impermissibly vague,
a defendant must demonstrate either (1) that the
statutes do not provide "the kind of notice that
enables ordinary people to understand what conduct
[is prohibited]," or (2) that the statutes "encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v.
Honie, 2002 UT 4, f 31, 57 P.3d 977 (citing
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct.
1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). Defendant has
failed to establish that the statutes violate either test.
B. Notice that Conduct Is Prohibited
[9] [10] H 14 "Vagueness questions are essentially
procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the
statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct."
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah
1987) (citation omitted). If a statute " 'is
sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader
what conduct is prohibited,' " it is not
unconstitutionally vague. Id. (quoting State v.
Theobald, 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982)). Here,
defendant contends that the criminal homicide and
aggravated murder statutes do not provide adequate
notice about what type of conduct is prohibited
because an ordinary person is left to guess at the
meaning of the term "unborn child." Thus,
defendant reasons, a person cannot " 'steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct.' " Village of Hoffman
Estates, 455 U.S. at 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (quoting
*\\15Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)).
We therefore must determine whether the term
"unborn child" is sufficiently definite to provide
adequate notice as to what conduct is proscribed.
1. Plain Meaning of "Unborn Child"
[11][12][13] 1f 15 "In considering the meaning of
a [statutory] provision, the analysis begins with the
plain language of the provision.... We need not look
beyond the plain language unless we find some
ambiguity in it." Utah Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd.
ofEduc, 2001 UT 2, If 13, 17 P.3d 1125 (citation
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

omitted). Moreover, "[t]he plain language of a
statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions
interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the
same statute and with other statutes under the same
and related chapters." Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19,
If 17, 5 P.3d 616 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
f 16 In State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1281-82
(Utah 1978), we held that a person could not be
convicted of automobile homicide for causing the
death of a twenty-six-week-old fetus because a fetus
was not specifically recognized in statute as a
human being. In response to our decision, the
legislature amended the criminal homicide statute
[FN4] to provide that a person is guilty of criminal
homicide if, acting with the requisite mental state,
the person "causes the death of another human
being, including an unborn child." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-201(l)(a) (1999). By its plain meaning the
statute recognizes that an unborn child is a human
being.

FN4. The criminal homicide statute is
statutorily linked to the automobile
homicide statute, which sets forth the
conditions under which criminal homicide
constitutes
the
specific
crime
of
automobile homicide. Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-207(l)(a),(2)(a)(1999).

\ 17 Defendant contends nevertheless that the
statute is unconstitutionally vague because "it is
impossible to ascertain from statute, or otherwise,
when unborn childhood begins." As a result, he
argues, an ordinary person is left to guess whether
his or her conduct falls within the parameters of the
statute because it is unknown at what point a
potential life actually becomes an unborn child.
\ 18 Although the defendant attempts "to inject
doubt as to the meaning of words where no doubt
would be felt by the normal reader," such straining
"is not required by the 'void for vagueness' doctrine,
and we will not indulge in it" here. United States v.
Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d
228 (1975). Instead, we will attribute to the
legislature the commonsense meaning of the term
"unborn child." Id.
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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«[f 19 "Unborn child" is defined as "[t]he
individual human life in existence and developing
prior to birth." Black's Law Dictionary 1058
(abridged
6th
ed.1991).
See
also
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1285
(10th ed.1998) (defining "unborn" as "not born,"
"not brought into life," or "existing without birth").
Therefore, without modifying language to the
contrary, the commonsense meaning of the term
"unborn child" is a human being at any stage of
development in utero because once fertilization
occurs, an unborn child is an "individual human
life" that is "in existence and developing prior to
birth."

322 S.E.2d 49, 53 (1984) (affirming convictions of
co-defendants for violation of Georgia's feticide
statute). Specifically, the Georgia Supreme Court
noted that the term "unborn child" in Georgia's
feticide statute would have "clearly cover[ed] the
entire period of pregnancy" if the legislature had not
limited it to the period where an unborn child is "so
far developed as to be ordinarily called 'quick.' " Id.
at 51, 53 (quoting Ga.Code Ann. § 16-5-80 (1982)).
The court's conclusion that the state's feticide
statute was not unconstitutionally vague was later
followed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386, 1387-88 (11th
Cir.1987).

2. Definition of "Unborn Child" in Other Chapters
of the Utah Criminal Code and in Other Jurisdictions

3. The Recent Amendment to the Criminal
Homicide Statute Does Not Demonstrate that the
Term "Unborn Child" Is Unconstitutionally Vague

f 20 This definition is consistent with how the
term "unborn child" is used in other parts of the
criminal code. For example, in a chapter of the
criminal code that regulates abortions, the
legislature mandates that informational materials be
made available to any person contemplating an
abortion. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-305.5(1) (1999).
The informational materials must include "the
probable
anatomical
and
physiological
characteristics of the unborn child at two-week
gestational increments from fertilization to full term,
accompanied by pictures or video segments
representing the development of an unborn child at
those
gestational
increments."
Id.
§
76-7-305.5(l)(b) (emphasis added).
If 21 Additionally, the legislature mandates that
the Utah Department of Health produce a videotape
"showfing] an ultrasound of the *1176 heart beat of
an unborn child at three weeks gestational age, at
six to eight weeks gestational age, and each month
thereafter, until 14 weeks gestational age.u Id. §
76- 7-305.5(4) (emphasis added). Thus, when the
plain language of the criminal homicide statute is
read in harmony with other chapters of the criminal
code, it is clear that the legislature intended the term
"unborn child" to encompass the period from
fertilization to birth.
Tf 22 Finally, case law from other jurisdictions
recognizes that "[t]here is no unconstitutional
vagueness in the description of the unborn as the
'unborn child.' " Brinkley v. Georgia, 253 Ga. 541,

^f 23 Defendant also contends that the legislature's
recent amendment to the statute demonstrates "in
and of itself that the term "unborn child" is
unconstitutionally vague. Effective May 6, 2002,
the legislature inserted "at any stage of its
development" after the term "unborn child." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-201(l)(a) (Supp.2003). Hence,
the statute now reads that "[a] person commits
criminal homicide if he ... causes the death of
another human being, including an unborn child at
any stage of its development." Id. (emphasis added).
If 24 Although we acknowledge that the statute is
now more precise, this does not mean that the
statute prior to amendment was unconstitutionally
vague. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that "[t]he fact that Congress might, without
difficulty, have chosen '[cjlearer and more precise
language' equally capable of achieving the end
which it sought does not mean that the statute which
it in fact drafted is unconstitutionally vague."
United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94, 96 S.Ct.
316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (quoting United States
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed.
1877 (1947)). Here, the legislature drafted a statute
that achieved the end that it sought, namely, to
include an unborn child within the definition of a
human being for purposes of the criminal homicide
statute. While adding the phrase "at any stage of its
development" made the statute more precise, it did
not alter the commonsense meaning of "unborn
child." We therefore conclude that the term
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"unborn child" provides the kind of notice that
enables ordinary people to understand what conduct
is statutorily prohibited.
4. The Term "Unborn Child" Does Not Render the
Aggravated Murder Statute Unconstitutionally
Vague
If 25 Finally, defendant contends that because the
term "unborn child" fails to provide adequate notice
concerning what conduct is proscribed, it renders
the aggravated murder statute unconstitutionally
vague. We disagree.
If 26 The criminal homicide statute expressly
includes an unborn child within its definition of a
human being. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201(l)(a)
(1999). This definition of a human being is
imported into the aggravated murder statute because
of the statutory link between the criminal homicide
statute and the aggravated murder statute.
If 27 Specifically, the aggravated murder statute
provides that [c]riminal homicide constitutes
aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of another " under any
one of seventeen circumstances, including killing
two or more persons during the same criminal
episode. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(l)(b) (1999)
(emphasis added).
*1177 1f 28 Defendant argues that because the
term "unborn child" is not defined in the criminal
homicide statute, it also renders the terms "another"
and "persons" in the aggravated murder statute
unconstitutionally vague because it is impossible to
know when an unborn child achieves the status of a
human being. Because we have already concluded,
however, that the term "unborn child" provides the
kind of notice that enables ordinary people to
understand what conduct is statutorily prohibited,
the term cannot render the words "another" and
"persons" unconstitutionally vague. We now turn to
a discussion of defendant's second argument;
namely, that the criminal homicide statute
encourages
arbitrary
and
discriminatory
enforcement.
C. Defining Conduct Sufficiently to Preclude
Arbitrary and Discriminatory
Enforcement

[14] f 29 In addition to providing adequate notice
about what conduct is proscribed, the "void for
vagueness" doctrine requires the legislature to
"define the criminal offense ... in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)
(citations omitted). In other words, the legislature
must " 'establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.' " Id. at 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242,
39L.Ed.2d605(1974)).
If 30 Here, defendant contends that "[t]he
Legislature's failure to clearly and specifically
define the term 'unborn child' not only encourages
but facilitates
arbitrary
and
discriminatory
enforcement" because "the prosecutor is left to
speculate at what point an unborn child becomes a
person for enforcement purposes." Additionally,
defendant contends that enforcement decisions will
be made "at least in part, by the prosecutor's own
thoughts or beliefs concerning fetal rights," because
the statute fails to provide adequate guidance.
[15] If 31 This argument fails for the same reason
that defendant's argument concerning adequacy of
notice fails. Defendant's argument is premised on
the notion that the legislature had to define the term
"unborn child" in order for the term to have a
definite meaning. The "void for vagueness"
doctrine does not, however, require a legislature to
define terms that are readily ascertainable. Because
the term "unborn child" has a straightforward
definition, as we have discussed above, a prosecutor
is not left to speculate as to the statute's meaning.
Thus, the legislature adequately established minimal
guidelines for the enforcement of the statute. We
therefore conclude that the statute is not
unconstitutionally vague either facially or as
applied because it does not encourage or facilitate
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
\ 32 In sum, we conclude that the term "unborn
child" is not unconstitutionally vague because,
absent modifying language to the contrary, it clearly
encompasses a human being at any stage of
development in utero. The statute thus provides
adequate notice to an ordinary person about what
conduct is proscribed. Moreover, because the
meaning of the term is readily ascertainable, its
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inclusion does not encourage or facilitate arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. Hence, the
criminal homicide and aggravated murder statutes
are sufficiently clear as applied to the defendant and
cannot be considered "impermissibly vague in all
[their] applications." Indeed, given our plain,
commonsense reading of the term "unborn child," it
is difficult to imagine any circumstance in which the
meaning would be unclear. Thus, defendant's
vagueness challenges fail, both facially and as
applied, and we affirm the decision of the district
court on this issue.
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f 36 Here, defendant's petition for interlocutory
appeal did not address the equal protection issue.
We therefore did not grant permission for defendant
to appeal this issue. Moreover, because the petition
made no reference to the equal protection argument,
and did not provide a concise analysis of the legal
authority, the State was denied the opportunity to
respond to this issue in its Opposition to Petition for
Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order.
We therefore decline to address defendant's equal
protection argument.
CONCLUSION

III. EQUAL PROTECTION
[16] ^f 33 In addition to challenging the criminal
homicide and aggravated murder statutes for
vagueness, defendant contends the statutes violate
equal protection guarantees under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article 1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
Specifically, defendant contends that because
physicians are not prosecuted for aborting fetuses
and microbiologists are not prosecuted for *1178
destroying fertilized embryos for stem cell research,
the statute "does not apply equally to all persons
within the class," namely, those who cause the death
of an unborn child. Hence, according to defendant,
the statute is unconstitutional.
TI 34 The State argues that we should not address
defendant's argument because he did not raise it
before the district court. Although we note that
defendant did make reference to equal protection
guarantees in his motion to dismiss, we need not
address whether such references were sufficient to
preserve this issue for appeal because defendant
failed to petition for interlocutory review of the
issue.
«f 35 Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure specifies that "[a]n appeal from an
interlocutory order may be sought ... by filing a
petition for permission to appeal from the
interlocutory order." Utah R.App. P. 5(a)
(emphasis added). The petition must contain "[t]he
issue presented" and a "concise analysis of the
statutes, rules[,] or cases believed to be
determinative of the issue stated." Id, at
5(c)(l)(B)-(C).

^f 37 In summary, the term "unborn child" does
not render Utah's criminal homicide and aggravated
murder statutes unconstitutionally vague. The
criminal homicide statute provides that a person
may be prosecuted for causing the death of a human
being, including an unborn child. Because the
commonsense meaning of the term "unborn child"
is a human being at any stage of development in
utero, the term provides sufficient notice to an
ordinary person about what conduct is proscribed.
Moreover, the term does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement because its
meaning is readily ascertainable. Consequently, we
conclude that the term "unborn child" does not
render
the
criminal
homicide
statute
unconstitutionally vague. We also conclude that the
terms "another" and "persons" are not rendered
unconstitutionally vague in the aggravated murder
statute by the fact that they encompass the term
"unborn child." We therefore affirm the district
court on this issue.
\ 38 We decline to address defendant's equal
protection argument. Although there is some
question concerning whether defendant adequately
raised this issue below, we need not determine
whether the issue was adequately preserved because
defendant did not petition for interlocutory review
of his equal protection argument. As a result, we
did not grant permission to defendant to appeal this
issue and we decline to address it.
^ 39 The district court's decision
defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed.

to

deny

K 40 Justice WELKINS, Justice PARRISH, and
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Judge NEHRING concur in Associate Chief Judge
DURRANT's opinion.

PARRISH, Justice, concurring:
% 41 I join in both the reasoning and the holding
of Associate Chief Justice Durrant's lead opinion. I
write separately to address the issue raised by the
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Durham.
K 42 The Chief Justice agrees with the lead
opinion's conclusion that the criminal homicide
statute permissibly defines killing an "unborn child"
as a homicide, but dissents with respect to whether
the defendant may be prosecuted for aggravated
murder. The dissent is predicated on the notion that
a fetus is not a full legal "person" under the laws of
the United States or the laws of Utah. Accordingly,
because the aggravated murder statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-202 (1999), provides that homicide is
aggravated murder if committed incident to a
scheme or course of conduct during which two or
more "persons" are killed, the dissent concludes
*1179 that the defendant may not be prosecuted for
aggravated murder.
1f 43 I disagree with the conclusion urged by the
dissent for two reasons. First, when read in context,
the term "person" as used in the aggravated murder
statute is clearly intended to include an unborn
child, and I do not believe this presents a
constitutional problem because it does not infringe
on any constitutionally protected rights. Second,
the defendant would nevertheless be subject to
prosecution for aggravated murder under a
provision of the aggravated murder statute not
addressed in the dissent.
If 44 The dissent is based on the premise that the
word "person" in the aggravated murder statute was
intended by the legislature to constitute a term of art
with a meaning independent of the statutory scheme
as a whole. In my view, however, the term "person"
as used in the aggravated murder statute, constitutes
only a generic reference back to the statutory
provision defining the elements of criminal
homicide, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201. In that
section, the legislature unmistakably provided that
causing the death of a human being, including an

unborn child, constitutes homicide. The following
section builds upon the criminal homicide statute by
designating the circumstances under which
"criminal
homicide"
constitutes
"aggravated
murder." Accordingly, when considered in context,
it is clear that the term "person" in the aggravated
murder statute must be interpreted to include an
unborn child. [FN 1]

FN1. The dissent points out that, in a
variety of contexts, the term "person" has
been interpreted not to include a fetus or
unborn child. While this is true, there is
nothing that requires the term "person" in
one
context
to
be
interpreted
co-extensively with the term "person"
when used in an entirely different context.
In light of the clearly expressed legislative
intent, I see no constitutional impediment
to interpreting the term "person" to include
an "unborn child" in the context of this
particular statutory provision.

f 45 Interpreting the term "person" in light of the
statutory context and clearly expressed legislative
intent is consistent with long-established principles
of statutory construction. " 'One of the cardinal
principles of statutory construction is that the courts
will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the
legislation, as indicated by the entire context and
subject matter of the statute dealing with the
subject.' " Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co. v. Payne,
782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (quoting Masich v.
U.S. Smelting, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, 616
(1948)). Indeed, the dissent's singular focus on the
word "person" as a term of art is inconsistent with
the fundamental principle that words are to be
determined in light of their association with
surrounding words and phrases and in harmony with
other statutes in the same chapter. Miller v. Weaver,
2003 UT 12, \ 17, 66 P.3d 592.
U 46 For similar reasons, I am not persuaded by
the dissent's concern that interpreting the term
"person" to include an unborn child would raise
federal constitutional issues. The dissent implies
that any statute that defines the term "person" to
include an "unborn child" would necessarily run
afoul of the federal Constitution, without regard to

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim i Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

84P.3d 1171
84 P.3d 1171, 491 Utah Adv. Rep. 41,2004 UT 4
(Cite as: 84 P.3d 1171)
the context in which that definition occurs or the
consequences that flow from that definition. I do
not agree with this principle.
f 47 Our interpretation of the term "person" in the
context of the particular statutory scheme before the
court neither implies that the rights of a fetus are
equivalent to those of a person for purposes of
federal constitutional analysis nor mandates the
conclusion that the term "person" is used in an
unconstitutional manner. I believe the legislature's
use of the word "person" to refer to a fetus would
create a clear constitutional issue only if it carried
with it a restriction of a constitutionally protected
right, such as in the context of a statute restricting a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. An
entirely different context is presented where, as
here, a third party is accused of attacking and
killing a fetus against the will of the mother. See
State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321-22
(Minn. 1990) (holding that a fetal homicide statute
does not impinge directly or indirectly on a
pregnant woman's privacy rights); 66 Fed. Credit
Union v. Tucker, 853 So.2d 104, 113-14
(Miss.2003) (holding that a wrongful death statute
protects a fetus, and that the rights of a mother as
outlined in *1180/toe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93
S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), have no relation
to the rights of a defendant accused of causing the
death of a fetus); People v. Ford, 221 Ill.App.3d
354, 163 Ill.Dec. 766, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1199
(1991) (holding that a pregnant woman who
chooses to terminate her pregnancy and a defendant
who assaults a pregnant woman, causing the death
of her fetus, are not similarly situated). This
statute's use of the term "person" to refer to a fetal
victim defines the crime of aggravated murder. It
does not declare a fetus to be a person entitled to
equal protection, nor does it restrict a woman's right
to obtain an abortion. In fact, there is no possibility
that the statute in question could undermine a
woman's right to obtain an abortion under the
federal Constitution because the statute specifically
provides that there "shall be no cause of action for
criminal homicide for the death of an unborn child
caused by an abortion." Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-201(l)(b) (1999 & Supp.2003).
f 48 I am unpersuaded by the dissent's conclusion
that the defendant should not be subject to
prosecution for aggravated murder for an
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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independent reason as well. The dissent focuses on
the portion of subsection (l)(b) of the aggravated
murder statute that refers to homicides committed
incident to one act, scheme, or course of conduct in
which "two or more persons were killed." Utah
Code Arm. § 76-5-202(l)(b) (1999). However,
even if we were to assume that the defendant could
not be prosecuted under that portion of subsection
(l)(b), it is my view that the defendant would be
subject to prosecution under the second clause of
that same subsection. Subsection (l)(b) reads in its
entirety:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated
murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of another under any of the
following circumstances:
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one
act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal
episode during which two or more persons were
killed or during which the actor attempted to kill
one or more persons in addition to the victim
who was killed [.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1999) (emphasis
added). In this case, the defendant has been
charged with the criminal homicide of an unborn
child pursuant to section 76-5-201. When the
unborn child is understood to be the "victim" of the
homicide, that unborn child was killed during an
alleged criminal episode in which the defendant
allegedly attempted to kill one or more persons, in
this case Susan MacGuire, in addition to the unborn
victim. Accordingly, the defendant may be tried for
aggravated murder under section 76-5-202(l)(b).
[FN2]
FN2. The fact that subsection (l)(b) uses
the terms "victim" and "person" in a
seemingly interchangeable manner bolsters
my conclusion that the term "person" as
used in that subsection was not intended by
the legislature to constitute a term of art,
but rather a generic reference to a human
being, including an unborn child, as used
in the criminal homicide statute, Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-201.

\ 49 I believe that the statutory provisions
addressing aggravated murder must be interpreted
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in the context of the statutory framework as a
whole. Accordingly, I have no difficulty concluding
that the term "person" as used in the aggravated
murder statute includes an unborn child. I therefore
concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant's
conclusion that the defendant may appropriately be
prosecuted for aggravated murder.

1f 50 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice
WILKINS, and Judge NEHRING concur in Justice
PARRISH's concurring opinion.
If 51 Justice RUSSON did not participate herein;
then District Judge NEHRING sat.

DURHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting:
K 52 I respectfully dissent. Defendant is charged
with shooting and killing his pregnant ex-wife and
her fetus. While these acts constitute two
homicides within the meaning of section 76-5-201,
a charge of aggravated murder based on the killing
of Ms. MacGuire and her fetus cannot be sustained
as the killing of two "persons" under Utah Code
section 76-5-202(l)(b).
L Section 76-5-201
\ 53 Pursuant to the language of section
76-5-201(1), "causfing] the death of another *1181
human being, including an unborn child" is
homicide, except that if the death is caused by
abortion it is not homicide. Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-201(1) (1999). Defendant contends that this
provision is unconstitutionally vague. I agree with
the majority that the statutory language is not so
unclear as to violate minimal constitutional
requirements.
\ 54 The term "unborn child" is not defined in the
statute and is not entirely clear in ordinary or legal
usage. In our society, the moral status of the fetus
is highly controversial. For many, a fetus,
especially in the early stages of pregnancy, exists in
a liminal state, somewhere between folly human and
not human. Our fellow citizens disagree radically
over when in this period of developing life an egg
and sperm combined have matured enough to
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warrant moral or legal consideration as a person or
a full human being.
\ 55 Some Americans, attempting to make sense
of the difficult issues surrounding family
responsibility and abortion, reserve the word
"child" for infants who have been born, or begin to
refer to a fetus as a "child" only at the point at
which they believe there is a reasonable likelihood
that it will be born. Thus, for example, one
commentator contends that in the view of many
Americans, "child" refers to a member of the
family. See Daniel JH Greenwood, Beyond
Dworkin's Dominions: Investments, Memberships,
the Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 Tex.
L.Rev. 471 (1994) (disputing Professor Dworkin's
view that no one believes that a fetus is a moral
"person" and arguing instead that a wide variety of
religious and secular observers see the fetus as
developing into a "person" and becoming entitled to
more rights and consideration over time, while
others see varying moments, ranging from the sex
act to birth, when those rights attach). Families
have a period of time after pregnancy has begun in
which they still may legally reject the responsibility
of raising a child-something that is morally
impermissible once they accept the developing fetus
as a child. In that usage, an "unborn child" would
refer only to a wanted pregnancy sufficiently far
developed to be likely to come to term. To apply
Utah's statute from that perspective, a prosecutor
would be required to prove that the mother had, in
fact, decided not to abort and that the pregnancy
was reasonably likely to come to term. Hence the
moral ambiguity of the term "unborn child" in the
statute.
f 56 A statute that used the word "fetus" rather
than "unborn child" would be clearer and more
respectful of the diversity of opinion in our society.
Nonetheless, the legislature is entitled to use
polemical and political language, even on highly
controversial issues, so long as the language gives
clear notice of what is intended to be criminalized.
The word "child" clearly includes the unborn in
such ancient phrases as "quick with child"; indeed,
the Oxford English Dictionary reports that it
appears to be descended from a word specifically
referring to the womb rather than an infant. The
modern usage of "unborn child," I believe, reflects
less an attempt (like Professor Greenwood's) to
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make sense of how so many Americans can support
legal abortion while also believing that mothers
have a duty to care for their children even
pre-natally, than the desire of those who oppose
abortion to find new linguistic opportunities to
emphasize respect for the fetus. In the context of
this case, I agree with the majority that it is
sufficiently clear that the legislature meant to
classify the killing of every fetus as a homicide and
that ordinary citizens will understand that intent.
Section 76-5-201 therefore passes "void for
vagueness" muster.
//. Section 76-5-202(l)(b)
1f 57 Section 76-5-202(1 )(b), however, is a
different matter. It provides that homicide is
aggravated murder if "the homicide was committed
incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or
criminal episode during which two or more persons
were killed." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(b)
(1999) (emphasis added). As discussed below, a
fetus is not a full legal "person" and cannot be so
constituted under the law of the United States or
Utah. The plain meaning of section 76-5-202(1 )(b)
is that killing a mother and her fetus cannot
constitute aggravated homicide.
f 58 Preliminarily, it is clear that the legislature is
entitled to protect to the fullest *1182 extent
pregnant mothers and their expectations of bringing
their pregnancies to term. Even supporters of legal
abortion agree that an assault which destroys a
developing fetus is a particularly heinous crime.
See, e.g., Beyond Dworkin's Dominions, supra, at
489. A violent attack by a third person on a mother
that also kills her fetus injures more than the mother
alone. One of the most fundamental of life's
experiences has been cut short; parents' aspirations
to bring forth a new generation have been shattered;
a family that could have been will not be; a life
that could have developed into an independent
individual has been extinguished. We need not
enter into any debate regarding the status of the
fetus itself to see that a state may freely increase
penalties for a homicide or an assault that also kills
a fetus: respect for the mother alone would be
sufficient. The power of the legislature to classify a
homicide that also unlawfully destroys a fetus as
aggravated murder, then, is not at issue here. The
problem is, rather, that the legislature has not
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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clearly done so. The aggravated homicide statute
applies when two "persons" are killed, and a fetus is
not a person under our law.
f 59 "Person" is a legal category with important
consequences. Most important, persons are entitled
to rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. It would be an obvious
denial of equal protection to allow doctors, or
anyone else, to kill one "person" in order to save
another, and clearly a denial of due process to
permit this without any legal process at all. Thus,
declaring a fetus to be a "person" entitled to equal
protection would require not only overturning Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d
147 (1973), but also making abortion, as a matter of
constitutional law, illegal in all circumstances, even
to save the life of the mother. [FN1] Utah law
reflects this principle. The legislature has stated
that "a woman's liberty interest, in limited
circumstances, may outweigh the unborn child's
right to protection," and has specified when
abortion is warranted. Utah Code Ann. §
76-7-301.1(4) (1999). A fortiori, if a fetus were
deemed a legal "person," its life could not be taken
intentionally in the process of honoring a pregnant
woman's "liberty interest." Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 n.
54, 93 S.Ct. 705 n. 54.

FN1. The due process and equal protection
clauses state, in relevant part, "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, cl. 1
(emphasis added).
f 60 For these reasons, as Justice Stevens has
stated,
[N]o member of the Court has ever questioned
this fundamental proposition [i.e., that a fetus is
not a "person"]. Thus as a matter of federal
constitutional law, a developing organism that is
not yet a "person" does not have what is
sometimes described as a "right to life." This has
been and ... remains a fundamental premise of our
constitutional law....
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,
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674 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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If 61 To declare a fetus a "person" is beyond the
power of the state of Utah, whether acting through
either its legislature or its courts. A state cannot
overrule the United States Supreme Court by
changing who counts as a "person" for
constitutional purposes. Justice Stevens, quoting
Professor Dworkin, put it this way:
The suggestion that states are free to declare a
fetus a person ... assumes that a state can curtail
some [existing] persons' constitutional rights by
adding new persons to the constitutional
population. The constitutional rights of one
citizen are of course very much affected by who
or what else has constitutional rights, because the
rights of others may compete or conflict with his.
So any power to increase the constitutional
population by unilateral decision would be, in
effect, a power to decrease the rights the national
Constitution grants to others.
Id at 913 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2791 n. 2 (quoting
Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether
and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. Chi.
L.Rev. 381,400-01(1992)).
*1183 If 62 Finally, even if the Utah Legislature
could define "person" to include a fetus, which I
believe it cannot, the legislature does not seem to
have done so. At any rate, no statutory language
defining "person," as opposed to "unborn child" or
"human being" has been cited to us.
Tf 63 If a fetus is not a "person" in the language of
the law, it follows that the defendant in this case,
heinous as his crime is, has not committed
aggravated murder within the meaning of Utah
Code section 76-5- 202(1 )(b). That provision
applies only when "two or more persons were
killed." In the case at hand, two lives were
extinguished: that of Ms. MacGuire and that of the
fetus she was carrying. Under Utah law, these two
killings may each be prosecuted as separate
homicides, but only one "person" was killed.
Defendant cannot be prosecuted for killing two or
more "persons," when only one of his victims was a
"person." I do not believe defendant can be tried
for aggravated murder under section 76-5-202(1 )(b).
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